Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

I.e., all the individuals mentioned in the previous chapter.

We do not expect the witnesses to lie on their behalf. Hence, the testimony of the witnesses is accepted even if the person did not benefit from the property for three years.

As explained in the following halachah, the intent is not that the witnesses are lying, but that the seller never willingly acknowledged or agreed to the sale.

Here also, the intent is that although the witnesses may have observed a sale, the woman did not willingly agree to it. She consented merely to appease her husband and maintain peace in her home, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 22:18.

Property for which the husband accepts financial responsibility. He agrees to pay a specific sum for this property regardless of its value at the time the ketubah must be paid. See ibid. 16:1.

Property that the husband returns as is at the time the ketubah must be paid (ibid.).

Hilchot Ishut 22:17. As stated there, in this instance the woman cannot rationalize her consent, saying that she merely intended to appease her husband. Since this property itself belongs to her, there is no reason for her husband to become upset if she does not want to sell it to him.

I.e., the robber admits that he originally took possession of the field through robbery, but then purchased it legally from its owner.

Ordinarily, this would be sufficient for the sale to be considered binding. Nevertheless, an exception is made, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain.

Despite the fact that the owner admitted receiving money, we pay no attention to his statement.

See Hilchot Gezelah 9:14-15. The rationale is that a sale carried out against the seller’s will is not binding (Hilchot Mechirah 10:1). The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 151:3) state that the owner must, however, issue a protest beforehand. Although ordinarily, the Rambam would also agree that such a protest be issued, he makes an exception in this case. The rationale is that since it has been established that this person seeks to obtain possession of this property through robbery, it is taken for granted that he will use compulsion to achieve his goals. Hence, there is no need to issue a protest beforehand. [See Tur, D’rishah (Choshen Mishpat 151).]

I.e., the son of a building contractor.

For despite his relationship with this person’s father, when the owner saw the son using the property for an extended period, he should have protested.

Since their claim is based on their father’s, it is no stronger than his would be. Just as his claim would not be accepted; so, too, their claim is rejected.
Similarly, if the grandson of these people claims to have inherited property that his father acquired, his word is accepted. If, however, he claims that the property was acquired by his grandfather, his claim is not accepted [Tur; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 152:1)].

As indicated by Halachah 1. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this concept is self-evident and hence favors a different version of Bava Batra 47a, the source for this halachah. His opinion is cited by the Tur and the Ramah (ibid.).

I.e., witnesses who testify.

Halachah 2. If, however, the son claims to have acquired the field himself, he may establish a claim of ownership (Maggid Mishneh).

The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) maintain that if witnesses testify that the owner acknowledged to the grandson that he sold the property to his grandfather - the robber - the acknowledgment is accepted. They maintain that it is unlikely that the fear of the robber would have motivated such an admission.

The rationale is that a gentile is considered likely to take property by force, and a Jewish owner will fear him as he fears a thief. The Rambam La’Am questions whether such a law would apply in the present age, when civil law prevents outrages of such nature. There are those who claim that, at present, the entire question is academic, because the legal owner of property can easily be identified since landed property is always registered in the deeds office. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that properties which Jews originally owned and which were taken away from them by force - but not by conquest - legally belong to them and must be returned even though hundreds of years have passed. Note, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 149:22, which quotes several Rishonim who state that if a gentile maintains possession of a property for 40 years, he establishes a claim of ownership.

If, however, he brings a deed of sale, his claim is accepted even when it is not supported by a claim of continued ownership. Although there are opinions that a robber cannot establish a claim to a property even if he brings a bill of sale, a distinction can be made between a person who is known to be a robber, and a gentile, who is merely suspected of being such.

According to Scriptural Law, such an oath is not required. This extra consideration for the plaintiff is granted only to a Jew.

I.e., he claims: “I purchased it from a gentile who claims to have purchased it from you.”

According to the Rambam, even a sh’vu’at hesset is not required, because the Jew does not have a definite claim - in contrast to the instance mentioned in the following halachah. His statements are based only on the claim of the gentile (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that since the claimant is a Jew, a sh’vu’at hesset is required. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Ra’avad’s argument is based on his approach (Chapter 1, Halachah 7) that when a person says “My father told me...”, it is considered to be a definite claim. Significantly, although with regard to that issue, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 75:21) mentions both views without clarifying which one should be followed, in this instance the Shulchan Aruch mentions only the Rambam’s view.
The Siftei Cohen 149:13 differs with the rationale of the Maggid Mishneh, but disqualifies the statements of the gentile because he has a vested interest in the matter.

Since he cannot issue a definite claim against the owner, his claim is considered to be without foundation. It is as if he has squatted on the property for years without a claim of ownership, as stated in Halachah 12.

Since he is asserting that he saw the transaction himself, his claim is definite. It makes no difference whether the other person involved is a Jew or a gentile.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo. Had he desired to lie, he could have done so more effectively.

The Lechem Mishneh (in his gloss on Chapter 13, Halachah 7) elaborates on the derivation of this law, explaining that the Rambam’s approach differs from that of the other commentaries. To explain: Bava Metzia 39a concludes from the statement that a relative should not be appointed as a guardian for a minor, that a claim of ownership cannot be established over the fields of a minor.
What is the logic? Other commentaries explain that we fear that the guardian will claim the field as his own. Now on the surface, even a non-relative who takes care of the field for three years can ordinarily claim the field as his own because he has established a claim of ownership. From this we conclude that, in this instance, such a claim cannot be established. Because the owner is a minor, one cannot establish a claim of ownership.
The Rambam (Chapter 13, Halachah 7), by contrast, explains that a guardian cannot establish a claim of residence for a different reason, because the guardian had permission to use the field. How then does the Rambam derive that a claim of ownership cannot be established over property belonging to a minor?
The Lechem Mishneh explains that from the passage in Bava Metzia, the Rambam derives two principles:
a) there is a possibility that people will try to obtain the property of a minor by deception; also
b) the minor might not know that the relative was not entitled to inherit the field and may not know of the necessity to protest.
Because of the combination of both these factors, the Rambam maintains that a claim of ownership cannot be established over a minor’s property.

This point is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. The Rambam’s approach is based on that of his teacher, Rav Yosef MiGash. However, the Ra’avad, the Ramban, the Rashbam, Rabbenu Asher and others differ and explain that even if the person maintains possession for three years after the child attains majority, he cannot establish a claim of ownership. Their rationale is the minor might not become aware that the property belonged to him until many years after he attains majority, for it is possible that he was not familiar with the details of his father’s estate. This was the reason he did not protest the other person’s use of the field. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:19) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah follows the other views.

I.e., property that he admits belongs to a minor, but is not publicly known to have belonged to the minor or his father.

Rav Yosef MiGash, the Rambam’s teacher, states that this applies even if the person did not maintain possession for three years during the lifetime of the minor’s father. Note the contrast to the following halachah.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, Chapter 6, which explains that in Talmudic times, it was customary to designate land as security for a loan. Unlike the situation at present, the land designated as security was actually given to the lender, who would benefit from its produce and reduce the debt by a set amount each year.

I.e., he was owed the money by the orphan’s father.

I.e., he can benefit from the produce according to the agreement he claims was made. As evident from the following halachah, there is no need for him to take an oath to this effect.

I.e., people at large mention that the person in possession is not the owner of the property, but rather received it as security. Since the person in possession did not establish a claim of ownership in the father’s lifetime, the fact that the property is reputed to belong to the child can nullify his claim.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s view, maintaining that even if the person in possession benefited from the field for three years while it was in the possession of the orphan’s father, the fact that the property is reputed to have belonged to the father and come into this person’s possession as security is sufficient to prevent him from establishing a claim of ownership.
The Kessef Mishneh and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 149) quote the statements of Rav Hai Gaon, who rules that if the person in possession benefited from the field for three years during the lifetime of the orphan’s father, before it was reputed that the field belonged to the father, he establishes a claim of ownership. If, however, the report of the father’s ownership spreads before the three years are completed, he does not establish such a claim. The rationale is that since the report was spread before the three years were concluded, if the person in possession in fact purchased the field, upon hearing the report, he should have taken care to preserve his deed of acquisition. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:20).

As stated in the previous halachah.

I.e., he will call them to court and produce evidence of the debt that he is owed.

See the notes on the previous halachah.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling based on the law (stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 3) that a person in possession of security must take an oath before taking possession of the security. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Rambam’s position, explaining that an oath is not required in this instance, because a severe oath is never taken with regard to landed property. And a sh’vu’at hesset is not required because the minor does not have a definite claim. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.) Note, however, the opinion of Rabbenu Asher [cited by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 150:6)], who maintains that since the orphans’ father could have required the person in possession to take an oath, the orphans are given the same privilege despite the fact that they do not have a definite claim.

Because of his concern for his life, he may not be able to take interest in what is happening with his property. Moreover, by protesting, he will make his whereabouts known to the king, who is seeking to kill him.

We assume that even if his creditors discover his whereabouts, they will not harm him, for doing so will not enable him to pay his debt any faster.

Who is entitled to benefit from property belonging to his wife and would have the responsibility of lodging a protest had someone benefited from it unjustly.

When the woman is herself responsible for her property.

Both the husband and the wife would have to agree to the sale. For since the husband is entitled to benefit from the land, his consent is necessary. And since the woman is the owner of the land, she must also consent.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo. Had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie.

We do not combine the two periods, because a woman relies on her husband to protest and does not concern herself with her property. Hence, the three years do not begin until after his death [Tur (Even HaEzer 87)].

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, the establishment of a claim of ownership is not “squatter’s rights.” Instead, the person in possession must claim to have purchased the land.

For since the field does not belong to him, he does not have the right to benefit from it either. That benefit is considered to have been stolen from the rightful owner and must be returned to him.

The owner is not required to take an oath, even ash’vu’at hesset, because the person in possession of the field cannot lodge a definite claim against him (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:18; Siftei Cohen 146:5). The Tur, however, requires that such an oath be taken.

If the squatter lodged such a claim, his word would be accepted, because he used the field long enough to establish a claim of ownership.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that even if he makes such a claim after first saying: “I don’t know whose field this was,” his claim is accepted, despite the fact that it is a reversal of his initial position. See Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:9).

For the person in possession has no basis for his claim to the land.

Similar laws apply to a person who claims to have purchased a property or obtained it from a debtor and afterwards, used it for the amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership. To retain possession of the property, he is required to produce proof that the person from whom he claims to have obtained it possessed it for one day [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:10); see also the conclusion of the following halachah].

He does not have to bring proof - or even offer an explanation - of how his father acquired it (Maggid Mishneh).

Alternatively, his claim is also recognized if his father benefited for the field for three years, even though he himself did not benefit from it at all [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:10)].

For the owner should not have sit idly by and allowed another person to use his field without protesting. The person in possession does not have to bring proof that he is in fact the heir of the person he claims to be his father or that he purchased it as stated in the following halachah. Since he maintained possession for the required time, his word alone is accepted (Ramban, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh).

For he has not substantiated his claim of ownership. Hence, not only the field, but all the benefit he received must be returned to the original owner.

In a manner that did not manifest his ownership.

Rabbenu Asher maintains that the law that follows applies even if the person in possession does not know that the field belonged to the protester, except on the basis of the statements of the person who sold it to him. The Siftei Cohen 146:9 differs and maintains that the person must be aware of the protester’s prior ownership in the basis of his own knowledge.

I.e., he took the field from me by robbery, and did not have any right to sell it to you.

For the person in possession has no proof, nor even a definite claim, that the person from whom he purchased the field ever owned it. He is relying on the word of the person who sold it to him alone.
The Maggid Mishneh relates that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the person from whom the field was expropriated sues the person who sold it to him. Some maintain that he is entitled to receive his money. Others (and the Maggid Mishneh favors their opinion) maintain that the seller can tell him: “The field was taken from you only because you admitted it belong to the protester. You must suffer the consequences of your admission.” The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:13) mentions only the latter view.

Since the person in possession admits that the field in question belongs to its original owner, there is no need for that fact to be established by witnesses.

As in the previous halachah.

Even if there are no witnesses who corroborate these statements (Tur).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:14) states that this point does not have to be stated at the outset, but can even be raised in the course of the debate in court.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo; had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie. (See, however, the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who maintains that it is because of the strength of the claim of ownership, and not because of the principle of miggo that he is granted the property.)