Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Validating the deed establishes conclusively that the field was purchased. Witnesses who testify to the establishment of a claim of ownership do not prove conclusively that the field belongs to the person in possession. Instead, their testimony creates a reasonable doubt that he is the owner. Hence, if the protester cannot damage the credibility of the claim, he is allowed to retain possession. Nevertheless, at the outset, we try to validate a claim in the most conclusive manner possible.

I.e., validate the signature of the witnesses through one of the means stated in Hilchot Edut, Chapter 6.

When the person in possession produces a valid deed of sale attesting to his ownership, he is allowed to retain possession. He is not required to support his claim with an oath. If, however, the deed is proven to be a forgery, he is required to return the land and its produce, despite having established a claim of ownership.

Because the witnesses are no longer available and no one recognizes their signatures. If, however, the witnesses to the deed are alive and in the city, they must come and testify for the claim to be validated [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 140:4)].

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 145) states that if one witness states that the person in possession sowed grain and the other says he sowed beans, their testimony is not accepted for there is a clear and obvious difference between these two species. Although Rav Yosef Karo disputes this ruling in his Bedek HaBayit, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 145:1 and the Siftei Cohen 145:1 support it.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this is speaking about a field located in a place where it is common to plant the fields one year and leave them fallow the following year. Thus, although both witnesses testify that he used the field according to the local custom, their testimonies cannot be combined. In a place where it is customary to sow a field year after year, such testimony would not be effective, because both witnesses testify that the owner left it fallow in between. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 4.)

Each element of the argument must be established by the testimony of two witnesses. Hence, it is necessary that two witnesses testify concerning each of the years.
Tosafot (Bava Batra 56b) state that the law quoted by the Rambam applies only when the witnesses explicitly contradict the testimony of the other - e.g., one says “he benefited in the first year, but not in the second,” and the other says, “he benefited in the second year, but not in the first.” The rationale offered by the Rambam indicates that he maintains that this law applies even when there is no explicit contradiction. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 145:2) follows the Rambam’s position.

The commentaries [see Tur (loc. cit.); Lechem Mishneh] have questioned the Rambam’s ruling. Why is he required to return the produce? Two witnesses do not state that he benefited from the produce at any time. Nor should he be held liable because of his own statements, since he maintains that he benefited from his own land.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s wording. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 145:3 takes the Tur’s objections into consideration and states that the term “produce” refers to the produce presently growing in the field.
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the Rambam’s ruling reflects his edict (Chapter 16, Halachah 6) that when witnesses - or even one witness - testify that a person benefited from a field for less than the time necessary to establish a claim of ownership, he is obligated to return the field and all its produce. Here, too, each of the witnesses is in fact testifying that the claimant did not benefit from the land for a period long enough to establish a claim of ownership.

E.g., the first was a third cousin, while the second was a second cousin. Originally, people were not aware of the existence of the second cousin. When they became aware, they granted him the property.

The Rambam’s decision is based on Bava Batra 33a. Because the law as stated by the Rambam is rather obvious, when stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 139:4) follows Tosafot’s understanding of Rabbenu Chanan’el’s interpretation which is slightly different.

This is speaking about a situation where neither is in physical control of the field at the time the matter is brought to court [Bedek HaBayit (Choshen Mishpat 146)].

I.e., when the proof supplied by the two claimants is of the same legal power, the law is the same as when they have no proof at all (Maggid Mishneh).

For if they do not testify concerning the same time period, we grant the field to the person whose witnesses testified that he possessed the field last (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., is able to overpower his colleague physically.

I.e., if the party who is overpowered can produce proof of his ownership, the field is given to him. Until he does so, however, the person who is strong enough to take control is considered to be the legal owner.

Since it is not determined who is the owner of the property, one might think that the law would not require that it be expropriated from a robber. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that it does.

His claim is stronger, because the witnesses he brings testify to a point that is not disputed: that his ancestors also owned the land.

Bava Batra 32a states that this teaches that even though rescinding its original decision will cause the reputation of the court to be disparaged slightly, the court takes that step to benefit the litigants.

This is speaking about a situation where neither of the claimants was in possession of the field at the time the question was brought to court. If the field was in the possession of either of the claimants, it is returned to him [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:23)].

I.e., since it was proven that the field had once belonged to the other claimant’s ancestors, this claimant would have to claim that he purchased the field from them. Since he does not make such a statement, we consider his claim that it belonged to him (and his ancestors) baseless, and accordingly require him to return the produce as well.

I.e., a claim that he acquired it from them.

As stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 13.
Bava Batra 33b questions: Seemingly, we should accept the person’s claim based on the principle of miggo. Since he has witnesses who state that he possessed the land long enough to establish a claim of ownership, he could have claimed to have purchased the field from the other claimant. Now had he desired to lie, he could have made such a claim. Since he did not do so, but instead claimed that the field belonged to his ancestors, his testimony should be accepted.
The Talmud does not accept this argument, explaining that since this claim contradicts the testimony of witnesses (the witnesses who testify that the field belonged to the other claimant’s ancestors), it is not accepted. This concept is accepted as a general principle in business law. Whenever a claim that could be advanced on the principle of miggo contradicts the testimony of witnesses, it is not accepted.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 5, which states that as long as a person’s final statements can be interpreted as a clarification of his initial statements, they are accepted by the court. As stated there, this applies provided that he did not leave the court. If, however, he left the court and then came back and offered this explanation, his statement is not accepted, because we fear that someone else suggested that he lie in this manner [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:24)].

The commentaries question: Why isn’t this very claim advanced on the claimant’s behalf by the court? As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 3, the court advances claims on behalf of an heir. [Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:24), who maintain that in fact the court should advance this claims on behalf of the heir.]
Tosafot (Bava Batra 31 a) explain that his statement: “It belonged to my ancestors,” appears to imply that it was always theirs. Although the interpretation offered here is not considered a new statement, it is not the obvious meaning of his words. Hence, the court does not offer such a claim.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 13, the claim that his ancestors purchased it would be acceptable only if witnesses testify that they used it for at least one day. Since such testimony is not available, the court does not advance such a claim. Alternatively, the court advances a claim on behalf of an heir only when he does not advance a definite claim himself. In this instance, however, he already advanced a definite claim.

This applies provided he brings witnesses who testify that his ancestors used it for at least one day, as stated above (Siftei Cohen 146:21).

Because it is a totally new statement and not merely a clarification of his original claim.

Implied in Reuven’s statements is that he is no longer in possession of his deed of purchase.

Apparently, Shimon’s claim would begin before Reuven’s, for a claim of ownership is three years.

Three years is the minimum amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership. Nevertheless, his statement could easily be interpreted as meaning the amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership and more. This would not be considered a reversal of his initial statements.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 8.

The commentaries question: Why is it necessary for Reuven to benefit from the field for more than three years? Why isn’t a claim of ownership established in three years, as is the ordinary practice?
The Maggid Mishneh explains that ordinarily a person must renew his protest after three years. Otherwise, we assume that he willingly granted the property to the person who took possession. When, however, the person sold the property, it is no longer his and he need not renew his protest. For once he has sold it, he has no right to rescind his commitment and retract the sale.
Nevertheless, a question can still be raised: Why don’t we believe his claim because of the principle of miggo? I.e., had he desired to lie, he could have claimed to have purchased the field from the owner three years ago.
The Maggid Mishneh answers that originally, when Reuven claimed that he had purchased the field from Levi, he did know that Shimon had a deed of sale attesting to his purchase of the field. Hence, we cannot say that he should have thought to say that he purchased from him.

Hence, since the testimony of the witnesses establishes the field as belonging to the other claimant, the claimant who stated that he consumed the produce is liable because of his own admission. We do not accept his claim that the produce belonged to him on the principle of miggo. Had he desired to lie, he would have denied partaking of the produce entirely. The rationale is that there are witnesses who testify to the opposite. Hence, the principle of miggo cannot be applied, as stated in the notes on Halachah 6 [Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 146)].

Had he desires to lie, he would have maintained that the deed of sale is valid.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:67 and the Siftei Cohen 146:28 state that this law applies even if the person in possession had not maintained possession of the field for three years.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:6, which quotes an exactly similar situation with regard to a promissory note. In that instance, the Rambam rules that the promissory note is not considered valid and the debt is nullified, while here we follow according to the deed of sale. The commentaries explain that the same rationale is applied in both instances: the property or the money is allowed to remain in the hands of the person who is presently in possession of it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:68).

The Rambam’s wording seems to imply that this law applies in all instances, even when travel and communication routes are not disturbed. The Ramban and the Rashba question this interpretation, for since the person in possession benefited from the field for more than three years, he establishes a valid claim of ownership. Why then should the former owner be able to raise a protest afterwards?
For this reason, these commentaries interpret the law as applying only in situations when there is a war or other factor disrupting travel and communication. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 2.) For in times of peace, even if the owner was not in the city, he could have conducted the sale via an agent [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:12)]. If there was no sale, the owner should have protested the other person’s use of his field.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling partially, explaining that it could be speaking about a situation when it was reputed that the owner was not in the city at the time the person in possession claims to have purchased the field. Similarly, Rav Yehudah of Barcelona explains that it applies only in an instance when at the outset, the person in possession mentions the date when the sale took place. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:11-12) mentions all three perspectives, without stating which one should be followed.

I.e., the field was surrounded by four other fields with no known outlet to a road or public thoroughfare. Originally, his field included an access path, but he - or those coming on his behalf - do not know where that path was.

I.e., the surrounding fields were owned by four different people, even though they had all purchased them from the same person.

I.e., at whatever price they ask.

I.e., if he is not willing to purchase a path, he is not allowed to pass through another colleague’s property to reach his own.

I.e., retract from the sale.

Hence, just as you could not compel any one of them to provide you with a path; so, too, you cannot compel me to do so. The Siftei Cohen 148:2 states that if the four people from whom he purchased the fields died, he is obligated to provide the claimant with a path.

Or one person originally owned all the fields, and he sold all of them to one other person (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 148:3).

For at the outset he had a path, and that path passed through the neighbor’s property.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies only in an instance when he maintained possession of the path for three years. Otherwise, the owner of the property has the right to protest. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Y osef Karo differs and maintains that since the claimant owned a path and claims that he recognizes it, he is given rights to it. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 148:2), Rav Karo follows his understanding, while the Ramah quotes the perspective of the Maggid Mishneh.